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THE CRISIS OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 
DR. WILLIAM YANDELL ELLIOTT 
President Bryan, Ladies and Gentlemen: 
It is a very generous yet a difficult introduction 
that your President has given me. I come back with 
great pleasure to William and Mary, and yet I always 
face an introduction by President Bryan with a certain 
amount of trepidation-to say nothing of your camera 
flashlights! I am enough of a Southerner to recognize 
the real oratorical tradition when I hear it, and you have 
been just listening to it in your President's introduction. 
What he said to you about my remarks I can at least 
bear out in the analysis that he has made as to what I 
think the crisis of the Constitution is: It is fundament-
ally a crisis of American citizenship-a crisis of citizen-
ship in a world which is very rapidly turning to those 
religions of the State that he has just described in 
such moving words. 
After all, the crisis is not for us, as that of Rome 
is, the crisis of a dead culture. I am standing at the 
present moment in the middle of a College which 
contributed, I dare say, more than any other edu-
cational institution in the country to the formation 
and development of the Constitution of the United 
States. I don't have to recite to you the fact that no 
less than four of your own students took part in that 
convention; that the Virginia plan, which was the very 
basis of the whole document, proceeded from the 
hands of William and Mary me,n, notably Randolph 
and Wythe; nor that McClurg and Blair, through 
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that long session contributed a maturity of wisdom to 
all the discussions. The development of that document 
into a living Constitution at the hands of Wythe's 
student John Marshall is a great tribute to the tra-
dition that William and Mary had built up even at 
that early time in our country. As a professor at 
Harvard I suppose I ought to feel some shame by the 
implied comparison of this record; but as a Southerner 
I rejoice in it. And, it is a peculiar pleasure to find 
that tradition is today still maintained under a leader-
ship as inspiring as you have here in your Wythe 
School of Citizenship; and that Southerners in partic-
ular, and Virginians most especially, are concerned 
today with what is happening to the Nation and what 
is happening to its fundamental charter. 
After all, tIle Constitution of the United States 
is a symbol of our own national life and being. We 
have not a king or a crown nor do we want them. 
George Washington might readily I think maintain 
that the Constitution is what he hoped it would be: 
"Let us raise a standard," he said to the convention 
over which he presided, "to which the wise and the 
just may repair. The event is in the hand of God." 
We know now from recently presented historical 
evidence that many members of that convention 
wished to make Washington a sort of uncrowned 
King-a strong man to restore unity to the distracted 
confederation. He might have turned the country in 
that Cromwellian direction. He put by the chance 
to become a Caesar, as he always put by temptations 
of that sort. He inaugurated a republic in the country 
that we now live in, dedicated to the principles that 
constitution stands for. 
One of the great principles of the makers of our 
Constitution was a frequent recurrence to funda-
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mentals. Let us to-day fearlessly follow their example. 
But first it is important in a time like this that we 
take some stock of our own situation in the world 
we live in. We are always talking about "times of 
crisis," but surely there was never a better justifica-
tion for those words than at the present moment. I 
remember a toast that the French Ambassador to 
Washington, M. Claudel, who was a considerable poet 
among other things, proposed way back in the days-
it seems way back, now!-in the days of the Hoover 
Moratorium,-when the French were hoping to get 
rid of the burden of the War Debt. He proposed a 
toast: "Here's to the little pause between the crisis 
and the catastrophe, for we live in it,"-and we do. 
A Frenchman today must have that feeling in a 
sense that he has not had since the days of 1914, and 
he may have reason to feel that the present crisis is 
even more dangerous to the inner life of France than 
the shock and trial of the grea t War. An Englishman, 
sitting uneasily on about a fourth · of the World's 
useful land surface,-a fifth of its total land surface 
perhaps, and in an empire that rules about a fourth of 
the World's population, that controls most of the 
great natural resources that lie outside the boundaries 
of the United States and Soviet Russia,-the lion's 
share as is well said,-an Englishman today, must 
have a deep feeling of insecurity for that empire. 
Perhaps that uneasiness penetrates even beneath the 
smug level that has been bred up by generations of 
mastership in the world, for he must know that his 
empire is being tested; and that whether or not it is to 
follow the courses of other empires of history will very 
largely depend on the decisions that are being made at 
this very time. 
The democracies of the whole world are on the 
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defensive. The timing of the brutal and absolutely 
ruthless thrusts that are being made at one point or 
another by the unholy trinity of the dictatorships of 
the "have-not" powers is a matter that must give con-
cern to anyone who views the future of the world and 
asks whether the principles to which we are dedicated 
as a nation can endure. Yet these are the principles 
for which our Constitution stands, which our daily 
life permits us to enjoy-freedom of thought in school, 
in university and college; that amiable kind of citizen-
ship with its give and take, which lives and lets live, 
tolerating differences of opinion and arriving at settle-
ments through political rather than violent means. 
It is that freedom which permits me to stand before 
this microphone and express sentiments that are ab-
solutely uncensored by anyone. I tell you those 
things {lre in danger in the world. 
Nor is it simply that they are in danger abroad. 
The reason I say that they are in danger at home is 
this: in a time of world crisis, such as the one in which 
we are living, the very nature of Government under-
goes a profound change, just as it does during a war, 
and to almost the same degree. The underlying 
sense of insecurity in which people exist breeds that 
change within every nation. We are readily accustomed 
to talking about recessions, depressions. We take 
more or less for granted the typical character of the 
recurrence of these periods in which want follows 
prosperity. It is an old story, in something of the 
fashion that Joseph saw in his interpretation of Pha-
raoh's dream, "though Heaven knows we have not had 
the seven fat years yet! But, those things go very 
deep when hundreds of thousands, and hundreds of 
millions of people, taken over the world as a whole, 
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are feeling disturbed and at a loss to know how to 
make honest effort count. 
The very nature of our industrial processes brings 
the necessity of organization on so large a scale as, I 
am convinced, we must have for the benefits of modern 
mass production. I don't believe we can go back,-
break up at this time that large scale organization 
which we have built up in this country both for re-
search and for marketing, and, for that matter, for the 
security of labor itself. The nostalgia for small scale 
business and for an agrarian simplicity is understand-
able. It has a romantic appeal. But it is a flight from 
reality in our present day world. It is frequently 
the case that large scale organizations have a better 
ability to plan and to forecast and to produce with the 
efficient division of labor. I don't mean that the 
existence of giant corporations in every branch of 
American industry is either essential or desirable. But 
I do mean that we are living in a super-industrial 
civilization which we can no more reject than King 
Canute could stop the tide from coming up. If we 
did reject it, we would be trampled down in the march 
of civilization by nations which were prepared to 
master that great beast, the machine, and go on. 
I belonged in the years just before and after the 
World War to a group of youngsters who used to con-
sider themselves poets, in the South, the Fugitive 
Group as they called themselves. Many of them have 
achieved national reputations to-day, well deserved. 
In later days they have been crusading against the 
machine in the interest of agrarianism. Books like 
"I'll Take My Stand" have been succeeded by "The 
Land of the Free," etc. I like farms-I support a farm 
myself-it doesn't support me; I support it. I suspect 
that most farming by those who prefer the agranan 
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gospel today is like that. If you are able to afford it. 
I am convinced that farming, "gentlemanly" farming if 
possible, is the good way of life. But I don't believe 
we can reverse the hands of the clock and turn back-
ward. We have got to learn how to master the kind of 
machine civilization we are living in. And that machine 
civilization, because it has taken away the tools of 
production from the individual, has created a pro-
found sense of insecurity that can only be managed 
socially through' social security, through collective 
effort, and I dare say, on a national scale. 
Now that is the first thing: We face an irresistible 
demand, an internal demand for social security, and 
on a national scale. Where is our federalism, our 
indestructible union of indestructible states? The 
question is rhetorical but the answer is painfully plain: 
The states are in Washington, hat in hand, asking for 
more relief and getting it at the price of a more cen-
tralized, a more national system. 
Yet the external aspects of this matter are even 
more threatening if you consider them honestly. What 
are the ultimate objectives of the dictatorial systems of 
the "have-nots" in this world? Can they be placated by 
concessions that will undo the Treaty of Versailles, 
which we are all glad to see go down the drain? Is 
Hitler to be satisfied, as so many of England's ruling 
class seem to think, with a slice, oh only a very tiny 
slice, of their Colonial empire? Will Mussolini, for ex-
ample, remain quiet in the act of attempting to digest, 
rather like a boa constrictor, the somewhat huge bites of 
territory that he has taken to himself in Ethiopia and 
the ones that he undoubtedly contemplates taking 
in Spain and northern Africa,-, whether by influence 
or directly so, is of little matter? Will Japan bog 
down in China, as many people think, and remain 
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bogged down and be rendered helpless? I doubt very 
much that this happy inertia of the sated will be the 
outcome, if the "have-nots" get their way. Wishful 
thinking would lead-me to hope it, but I believe there 
is a profound inner cause of self destruction in these 
systems: Dictators who have promised their nations 
the moon, can never stop arming to get it. They are 
driven on by an inner compulsion, always farther and 
farther. Every concession that is given them merely 
whets the appetite for more, because the dictator must 
release the dissatisfactions that grow up under the 
tightening of the belt inside the nation. Instead of 
butter, he gives his people cannon-painful substitutes. 
Rearming comes out of the lowered power of consump-
tion of his people. He must release their resentment by 
turning to outside enemies when he no longer has in-
side the sca pegoa t of Jews or something of that sort, 
and scapegoats don't last forever. In other words, 
the very nature of that planned system of totalitarian-
ism leads on and on into a world of "living danger-
ously" in which there is no end to the road but war. 
Machiavelli put it and Mussolini today re-echoes it: 
"Expand or perish." I don't think the "or" is the proper 
conjunction. It should be "Expand and Perish" and 
tha t will mean the destruction of a great part of what 
we know as Western civilization in the holocaust. 
Now, what is our situation in the United States, con-
fronted by tha t kind of a picture? We see the weaken-
ing of all those barriers, which we have been inclined to 
take for granted, of our own ultimate security. That fact 
comes closer home every day in Latin America and in 
Central America and in Mexico. We are beginning to feel 
repercussions from the drive of these hungry powers in 
regions that lie well within the sphere we are accustomed 
to treating as being protected by the Monroe Doctrine. 
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And what is more than that, the contagion of the 
idea of dictatorships is abroad; and there is a contagion 
in ideas. When people feel profoundly insecure in their 
daily lives; when through inflation a middle class has 
been wiped out; when a nation has suffered humiliation, 
and wishes to forget it or to escape from it in dreams and 
delusions of grandeur; when it feels the futility of its 
own political institutions, that nation is ripe for a 
dictatorship. We do not believe-I do not believe, 
those conditions exist in the United States today. 
We are not leaderless in the United States; we have 
not gone through the wringer of inflation and I pray 
that we may be spared it-though one of the points I 
am trying to make today is that we must look into the 
fundamentals of our constitutional system in order 
to spare ourselves. Nor do I believe that we are 
humiliated,-on the contrary we are perhaps the 
cockiest people in the world-too much so I think. 
We agree on our superiority among ourselves and would 
like others to be able to see it, too. We don't know 
what it is to be licked in a war. If we were licked, we 
wouldn't know it, even then. It was only the fact 
that we didn't know we were licked in the War of 
1812-1815 that enabled some of my own tribe to lug 
their long rifles down to New Orleans and lick the 
British after the Treaty of Peace had been signed. 
We don't suffer from the kind of an inferiority com-
plex that is conditioning the action of Germany, 
Japan, Italy and many other nations. 
And we haven't the feeling of futility about our 
political institutions. Perhaps when we begin to pay 
our bills we may feel otherwise. 
But there are some aspects of these threats that 
come home to us from both fronts, the inner front 
and the outer front. When the world is re-arming, 
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as it is today all over the world, it means that or-
dinarily we get into a state of war psychosis where 
fear dominates every action. We haven't come to 
that point yet. But we are passing bills, and rightly 
passing bills in my judgment, in the billions of dollars, 
for naval defense and for armies. We are straining the 
resources of our system, though not yet to the point 
that the British and French are doing, to get ready for 
"the day." There is already an "M" Day Bill in 
Congress, a Mobilization Day Bill-rather wrongly 
called a bill "to take the profits out of war". This 
la tter pious aim figures in the last part of the bill and 
only in terms of something "for future study." But 
that bill would set up something like a totalitarian 
state in this country. I think possibly it would have 
to, during a war. We did something of the same sort in 
a modest way during the last war. Am I wrong then 
in feeling that the shadow of war hangs very heavily 
over this nation today? 
Mind you, I don't regard the Byrnes Bill for the 
administrative reorganization of our federal services, 
that has been so bitterly and, I daresay, maliciously, 
assailed, as in any way containing the possible threat of 
dictatorship. I want to put myself on record on that 
and come back to it. On the contrary, it is merely 
giving to the Executive of the United States those 
powers that under the Constitution he must have to ex-
ecute faithfully the law, and which under the Articles of 
the Constitution governing the separation of powers, 
any President needs and must have. They are powers 
which President after President, as Mr. Hoover was 
honest enough to say the other day, has tried to get in 
vain from Congress, because of the nature of our pres-
sure politics and spoils system. From Taft's time on, 
every President of the United States has been rebuffed. 
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I say I don't regard the Reorganization Bill as a threat, 
but I do point to you that the nations that are headed 
toward war are going to have to alter their forms of 
government in order to centralize power. A nation pre-
paring for war, a war on poverty or a war against 
external enemies -is like an army: there has to be staff 
work. The idea of a "general staff" inevitably begins to 
function in government under those conditions. Un-
less we can meet these demands under democratic, 
and Consititutional terms we may one day find our-
selves meeting them under quite other · terms. In 
other words, in my judgment, it is better to anticipate 
and to prevent this trend from getting out of hand, if 
we are to maintain the constitutional tradition that 
the men of this College attempted to establish when 
they put into effect in that final crisis that they were 
facing, the Virginia plan for national government that 
could govern and could govern responsibly. 
Now, how is this to be done? What are the things 
that we face today in our constitutional system that 
are threatened-what remedies can we take? 
I want to suggest that our system needs revision 
today first in respect to our federal units of government 
and second by bridging the gulf between President and 
Congress by means of a general election. 
First of all, what is the American Constitution 
that I have been talking about here? Many of you 
may think that I mean only the document that came 
out of the Constitutional Convention. That docu-
ment was ratified by conventions in the states after 
long and very brilliant and interesting debates and a 
rather bitter struggle, and it has been amended 
twenty-one times, and will be still further amended, 
I hope. No, I mean something more even than that. 
I mean the constitutional system of the United States 
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as it works. That is the true constitution of any 
country: the working system that has grown up about 
fundamental law. 
There is nothing in the Constitution whatever 
that says the President shall be elected in the way that 
he .is. The Electoral College has been gradually 
changed by usage into agents who are absolutely 
instructed-delegates and not men with individual 
discretion. You may regard that, and I do regard it, 
as perhaps a mistake. But it has happened. The 
usages of our Constitution, the practices, and there are 
many of them, determine what the system is and how 
it works. 
One of the most important of those usages is the 
power of the judiciary in the system, which I think 
was intended by the men of the Constitutional Con-
vention, to function as a protection of genuine funda-
mentals, but not in the extreme form of judicial 
censorship that it has become at times in our history. 
The power of judicial review was, in my judgment, 
and I have placed a good deal of study on that-
deliberately intended, but I don't think it was ever 
intended that the judges should set themselves up as 
censors of all social policies. The early justices said 
that in the clearest language, in decisions of about 
1795. Chase and Cushing put it very well, in terms 
about like this: We ought to remember that the 
right to declare a law unconstitutional, if it exists in 
our system [and it had not yet been exercised at that 
time] in respect to a Federal law should be exercised 
"only in a very clear case." That is an important 
self-denying ordinance which I recommend to the 
judiciary and which I think the judiciary is probably 
going to follow in times to come in this country. 
Subject to that reservation, I think that there is no 
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more important bulwark of our liberties than an in-
dependent judiciary. It is one of the things that is 
regularly attacked by every dictatorship in order to 
bring law under arbitrary control. 
While I could sympathize with the distress that 
Mr. Roosevelt felt at the kind of decisions that the 
majority of the Supreme Court were giving him a 
year or two ago, I did not feel sympathy with the 
method by which he proposed to remedy them, and I 
think the same feeling of uneasiness about the use of 
a round-about method of what amounted to packing 
the Court, was a very sound indication of the attach-
ment of Americans to their Constitutional system. 
Now, the crisis has for the moment passed. It 
leaves behind it though certain questions which I 
should like to raise with you about the future of the 
judiciary. Our Constitutional System is not only 
what the judges say it is, but what the amending 
power can make it, and what usage will make it. 
Today I want to lay before you the suggestion that 
what we have to avoid is changing our whole system 
just by usage-by usurpation, by the necessity of twisting 
a document into distortion. We need, on the contrary, 
to bring to bear upon its orderly and constitutional 
amendment, in certain features, the best thought that 
this country can produce, and the same kind of effort 
that went into its creation a hundred and fifty years 
ago. 
Of course there are still parts of this country that 
don't believe that this is a nation even today. Vir-
ginia, the Old Dominion, I think is no longer one of 
them. We have, I think throughout the South, 
generally speaking, accepted the fact that we are a 
nation. Not that the Civil War settled that for us. 
But our acceptance of national unity arose from a 
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growing conviction that has come about through our 
own contribution to the nation. If there is a part of 
the country today that is secessionist it is probably 
in New England, and most particularly in Vermont 
and Maine. (I trust they will not hear in Boston over 
these air waves the remarks I have just made!) 
But this is a federal country in spite of being a 
nation, and the protection of the rights of the states 
and of the reality of those rights depends upon having 
in the working of the State governments the possi-
bility of solving the problems that those state govern-
ments have before them. That is the first main point 
in the actual work of our constitutional system that I 
raise to discuss with you. Can we, through the exist-
ing mechanism of the states, hope to have areas ad-
equate, politically and economically, to the burdens 
put upon them? Isn't it precisely the fact that those 
areas are not grouped in a way that is adequate to 
that purpose which is fatally transferring everything 
to Washington,-a tendency that I certainly feel is 
very dangerous. But I don't see any remedy for it as 
long as we are dealing with areas like the states in 
their present form. New England is a real area 
today, and it would be most useful there (I can say 
it here; I hope that my voice is not carried by this 
microphone back there), it would be most useful to 
have the city of Boston, for instance, dominated by a 
New England region rather than have the city of 
Boston politically dominating the politics of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts to the degree that 
it does. It will be most necessary, perhaps, in the 
future of our country to get the great metropolitan 
areas of this country balanced and perhaps over-
balanced by back-country. But I daresay, from my 
backwoods Tennessee point of view, if you don't 
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mind, President Bryan, the great part of this country 
outside the few largest cities is sounder in American 
tradition than the metropolitan areas are ever likely to 
be, though New York seems to be on the up grade. 
In that respect, I am afraid that I share somewhat 
Jefferson's distrust of urbanization. I think the 
problem of dealing with urbanization is very largely 
a problem of balancing the political powers of this 
country in regional groups large enough to do the job. 
The problem isn't an acute one for you in Virginia. 
You have the oldest tradition of any state, perhaps, 
except Massachusetts, and there you will be rivaled. 
You have not the problems that Massachusetts has 
inherited because of the potato famine in Ireland 
almost a century ago and other things that I needn't 
go into. 
Bu t you are also Americans, as well as Virginians, 
and you recognize the fact that these problems exist, 
and that it may well be that the existing grouping of 
our Federal units is one of the large reasons why we 
are drifting to such a degree of centralization. Both 
because the cities have too much weight in the national 
political picture at the present time-because of a few 
great city machines,-and because the existing ter-
ritorial areas of the states, as constituted at present, 
are not natural economic units, we need to consider 
a radical change in the basis of our federalism. 
Carter Glass, in drawing up the Federal Reserve 
System-a feat of great constitutional statesmanship 
that we must never forget, for which he ought to be 
eternally honored,-had some sort of picture like this 
before him-those twelve districts. This is an im-
portant matter for our study. I am not going to try 
here to lay down the criteria for settling the outlines 
of these new Federal Regions that seem necessary for a 
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sound federalism. The Federal Reserve Districts sug-
gest to my mind, to a considerable degree, the need of 
areas that would transcend the barriers of the states 
sufficiently to have large enough grouping to play the 
role that once Massachusetts and Virginia played, and 
which no doubt Massachusetts and Virginia would to 
some degree still lead in any such regional group. We 
need political units comprised of regions homogeneous 
to some degree in culture and in their way of looking at 
things-that is essential in a federal country. The 
South, you see, splits itself up into units of this sort. 
You know as I do that there is a genuine difference of 
feeling between parts of the South that are just be-
low the Mason-Dixon line and some that are very 
much below the Mason-Dixon line. I don't think 
I need to specify further than to say that Huey Long 
is a phenomenon which could not have happened in 
Virginia. 
Now, let's take my second main point: the separa-
tion of powers in our system. We started off with a 
conviction about the separation of powers which was 
partly due to some misconception of the English system 
that we got through Blackstone and that he had in-
herited in some degree through Montesquieu,-that the 
English system really was one of separated powers. 
At the time they wrote, it was a far more genuine sep-
aration of powers than historical critics are prepared to 
admit. After all, George III did run a good deal of the 
executive power of England. In spite of what people 
said, in the light of later constitutional procedents, 
he was powerful. Our colonial experience also led us 
into accepting the reasoning that to separate the 
executive, legislative and judicial functions was to 
prevent them from falling into the hands of a single 
and therefore an arbitrary person. The presidency 
{ 17 ] 
was set up on an entirely separate basis from Congress. 
The two ends of the Avenue in Washington are sig-
nificantly two ends of the A venue-Pennsylvania 
Avenue. If you want to get them together today, 
how do you go about it? Well, I am afraid we must 
confess the fact that the separation of powers in this 
United States of America is bridged by "patronage" 
and "spending." Am I wrong about that? I don't 
think so. Sometimes there are presidents who do not 
feel inclined to bridge it in that way. They won't 
"play ball with the boys," and they don't get to the 
first base, politically, if I may express the plain fact in 
that way. Mr. Hoover had that difficulty, to a degree. 
He didn't have the technique that had been developed 
in Al Smith and in Franklin Roosevelt by dealing 
with state legislatures. 
There is this significant fact about the history 
of our country which I want to call to your attention 
on the authority of the late Will Rogers, who was a 
very considerable critic of our institutions, as well as 
a great humorist. According to Will, there was no 
president after Jackson, at any rate, who managed to 
control his Congress throughout his entire term of 
office. He said the possible exception to that state-
ment-and you may disagree with him, but you think 
about it pretty hard and I believe you will find Will 
was right-the possible exception to it, he said, was 
Calvin Coolidge: The reason was that if "Cal" did 
know what was on his own mind, he never told any-
body; so Congress could not find out in order to 
block him. 
Well, it is like that. Being president of the 
United States is like driving a balky mule. When 
Al Smith came up to dine with the Forty Harvard 
Thieves, as we were locally known-Ali Baba Smith 
[ 18 ] 
and the Forty Harvard Thieves-after his defeat in 
1928, those of us who had signed a manifesto for him 
talked over with him this feature of our system that 
Will Rogers had commented on. I told him the story, 
at that time, of the negro and the ice wagon and the 
balky mule, which must be a classic down here-it 
certainly is in Tennessee-that I think profoundly 
illustra~es the character of our political system in this 
respect: The separation of powers between the 
President and Congress. It is about Jim, who drives 
the ice-wagon for Mr. Hogan, the local ice-man. 
Jim resigns after the mule has balked in the public 
square in front of the court house. He calls up Mr. 
Hogan on the telephone to inform his boss. After a 
long conversation, in which Jim recounts · the catas-
trophes which befell various helpful by-standers who 
thought that they could budge the mule, Jim finally 
gets to the point: "Yassuh, Mistah Hogan! I done 
tried that, too. Yassuh. I built a fiah under dat 
mule. Yassuh she moved, she sho moved. She 
moved just bout fifteen feet, Mr. Hogan, and burnt up 
de ice wagon!" 
I want to put it to you that our experience with 
everything that we have tried in the way of the 
executive budget and the other devices for strengthen-
ing the hold of the executive on the legislature, and for 
getting mutual responsibility has so far resulted in 
that end: The legislature moves up about fifteen feet 
and burns up the ice wagon! I don't suggest that 
Governor Smith's only qualifications for the presi-
dency were that he could drive the balky mule. Not 
at all. Diplomacy in getting along with the Legislature 
is essential under any conditions, and the Legislature 
has good reasons to criticize the executive and hold 
him to account-that is the essential part of parlia-
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mentary government wherever it exists in a true 
form in the world today. But there must be a re-
lationship between these two that is more organic 
in its responsibilities than any thing we have yet 
worked out if we are ever to get a civil service. 
I have backed the Byrnes' Reorganization Bill and 
I think it is a good job. It blankets a lot of people in 
the civil service, and you will never get them there 
in any other way. I hope it will keep them in the civil 
service but I haven't very much confidence that it 
will. I don't believe that under our system any 
President with a change of party is ever going to 
forego the weapon of patronage that he has to use in 
order to hold his party in line. If there weren't a 
Mr. Farley in each party you would have to create 
one, Democratic or Republican. You know the nature 
of politics as well as I do in that respect. You can't 
make our administration work, under the present 
separation of powers, without patronage and spending. 
How could you make it work? Well, I want to 
suggest to you at least a thought on that matter. 
I think, first of all, an item veto for the President is a 
very desirable thing. It strengthens his hands against 
"riders" that is, bills of an entirely different character 
that are attached to bills which he must accept. E. g., 
the Miller-Tydings Bill, which you mayor may not 
support, but which will cost you money in preventing 
prices from being cut on trade-marked and copyrighted 
articles, was federal legislation allowing price-fixing of 
that sort to be sanctioned by the states which have 
passed such legislation. That bill was passed as a 
rider to the District of Columbia Appropriation Bill 
which Mr. Roosevelt had to sign or see the Govern-
ment starve. 
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When we are talking about executive dictator-
ships, let's think a little bit about the other side of 
responsibility. What is it you are trying to get in your 
system ? You hold the President responsible for doing 
things. What do you want him to do? What ma-
chinery do you equip him with to do it? Do you de-
mand that he go to the radio and have a fireside chat 
and that the country react one way or another and 
that telegrams to Congress will register results? It 
is a very bad way of having a general election. Father 
Coughlin and others seem to use that technique to 
better advantage than the great and rather inarticulate 
masses of our people who vote only on election day. 
We don't-most of us-get around to sending tele-
grams to Congress, and it isn't, in any case, the way 
to settle issues of this sort. Yet today, it is the only 
way that we have and we have to try to work it. 
No doubt it is very nice for the telegraph companies. 
Pressure politics become characteristic of a system 
in which minorities really put the screws on our 
representatives. In that respect, ladies and gentle-
men, I raise this serious question with you: Have 
not the institutions of our political systems devel-
oped into this type of pressure politics largely be-
cause of the separation of powers which prevents 
the responsibility of disciplined party control? The 
Senate, for instance, is a hotbed of minority and 
group and bloc action. It is not a majority organ 
or under party control. I raise the question as to 
whether or not that must be corrected if we are not to 
develop a distrust of our institutions, a feeling of 
futility, a sense that Congress has become a log-rolling 
body. 
But there is the other side of the picture. You 
must protect Congress,-that's all there is to it. 
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As citizens you must protect Congress if it is to pro-
tect you. If you were in Congress (or I were there) 
you or I would have to make peace with this same 
kind of pressure. At the back of the trouble with our 
system lies the fact that we are subsidizing everybody. 
We are bringing to bear in government the kind of 
pressure that makes it impossible to have a balanced 
budget and a responsible system. I think that, in 
President Bryan's words, that's the failure of citizen-
ship. It comes back to a fundamental that we don't 
think of government as a community interest, but as 
something like a grab-bag. How do you treat your 
repesesentative in Congress ? You have a good tra-
dition in Virginia and I can exempt you from the worst 
of our "pork-barrel" politics. But it is far too often in 
every part of the country, and I can speak with some 
knowledge, a matter of what the Congressman or the 
Senator has "done for the district" that determines 
whether he will stay in politics. And above all he must 
make no enemies. 
Now I am an American and I am concerned with 
what happens through organized pressures of groups 
like labor and bankers and cotton growers, and other 
people who run our country to some degree in terms of 
response to pressures, without framing policy in the 
"public" interest. I want to point out to you that the 
public interest is the thing which the men who created 
the Constitution were concerned to protect. Now, it 
can be protected in several different methods. It 
can be protected by the Court, which will hold people 
to the settled rules of the game, and it ought to be 
protected by the Court as long as the court is en-
forcing those rules and not making them. And I think 
today that the Court is in a fair way to do that. I 
would like to suggest that if the Court had the power 
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of rendering advisory opmlOns or speeding up its 
opinions, we would get a great deal more speed as 
well as security in our law. 
In the second place, the "public interest" can 
be protected by an executive who has an item veto, 
to some degree at least. So armed, he can delete 
"riders" and protect his own budget. But in my 
judgment, that executive sooner or later has to have 
the right to appeal to his country as a whole. If he 
had the right to call a general election, he wouldn't 
need patronage and spending to bribe his party into 
line. In England, the Cabinet doesn't have patronage. 
They do have a balanced budget. Why? Because the 
Prime Minister can say to the members of his party, 
either we go along together or we face the country 
and you ask them whether they back you or me. 
That's democracy. Sooner or later this country has 
got to find some way of dealing with our political 
questions in order to get the public interest registered 
by a genuine majority under constitutional restraint. 
In our system the President should have the right to 
call such an election once during his term. If he lost 
it, he should lose also his veto powers. If he resigned, 
his successor should be selected by Congress. I am 
convinced that the men who wrote the Constitution 
in the main viewed with alarm the equal powers of 
the long-term and small-state Senate over money bills, 
which has been one of the biggest opportunities for 
jobbery, for pressure politics and for throwing budgets 
out of balance and for that kind of thing. The Senate's 
powers over taxing and spending should be subordi-
nated to those of the House. . 
I am presenting to you what, I believe, is not the 
usual analysis of the troubles of our constitutional 
system. But I ask you, in all honesty as Americans, 
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to consider whether these troubles, in times and under 
pressures such as we now see working from within 
and without, don't transcend parties or personalities-
whether they don't coerce any President into a line 
of conduct that will make him ultimately do things 
tha t will be distressful to you and to me as American 
citizens; or- alternatively, make him lose his hold. I 
ask you whether we haven't a real question in our 
Constitution to consider, as to the nature of our system 
of states, given the present drift toward handing 
everything over to Washington. Let us organize our 
system better; let the citizens support it better, and 
above all, let us see that the changes that are made 
in it be made lawfully and by constitutional methods, 
in order that we can hand down through these difficult 
times the priceless heritage that the Constitution of 
the Unites States is to the American people. 
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